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Abstract 
 
The thesis aims to offer an insight into how is Serbian identity re-constituted in the post-
conflict period and what role does the European Union play in the process of identity re-
construction. Specifically, it aims to discuss the issue of how is Serbian identity being 
reproduced in relation to the prospect of EU membership. How is the possibility of 
joining the EU changing the discursive construction of Serbian identity? The core of the 
study is the post-conflict challenges facing Serbian society analysed within a context of 
cooperation with the European Union, and Serbia’s relationship with its own radical 
past. The study thus focuses on the tension between two strands of Serbian identity—one 
based on a 1990s Milosevic’s political discourse and another on supranational 
identification with "EU” structures. Also, by looking at the political changes in Serbia 
after 2000, this thesis aims to investigate how national identity is being re-structured in 
relation to foreign policy decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century Serbia’s political setting started to change 
intensely. After a long period of conflict which started in the early 1990s and resulted in 
an overthrow of Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, post-conflict transition 
came at great cost. The post-Milosevic years were being spent in difficult political 
circumstances that challenged all aspects of the Serbian state, such as the unresolved 
status of Kosovo and the cooperation with international institutions and organizations – 
with the European Union, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
etc. The post-war period of recovery and democratisation posed further challenges to the 
political elites in terms of how to adapt to the new environment and articulate their 
political identities. 
The presidency of Slobodan Milosevic increasingly distanced Serbia from the 
international community, as well as Serbia’s possibilities of joining the European Union. 
Therefore, the loss of Slobodan Milosevic to a coalition of nearly twenty opposition 
parties and movements which were brought together in the Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia (DOS) opened up possibilities for transformation and reformulation of national 
goals and norms harmonious with European positions. The breakthrough parliamentary 
and presidential elections that took place in 2000 indicated the possibility of a new path 
that would direct Serbia towards membership in the European Union and away from the 
protectionist politics that characterised the Milosevic era. The creation of a new political 
environment was thus received with anticipation and optimism and the membership of the 
European Union was put forward as a major foreign policy goal after the year 2000.  
The European Commission recently announced (22.4.2013) that EU-Serbia 
membership negotiations should soon begin. According to the recent statement, EU-
Serbia negotiations would begin in January 2014 at the latest.
1
 The significance of 
opening accession talks with Serbia after a period of rather tense relations between the 
two units is enormous. Arguably, the new era for Serbian politics has begun and the 
country is closer to the membership than it has ever been – “closing” its radical 
nationalist past and becoming a member of the European Union.  
                                                          
1
 ‘EU set for Serbia membership talks’, 2013, BBC News, [online] 
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This research aspires to contribute to the understanding of the processes that led 
to the possible opening of accession talks more than a decade after the war. I argue that 
for such changes to occur, a profound redefinition of Serbian identity was needed. The 
focus of this research is thus the issue of Serbian political identity and how that has been 
changing in the post-conflict environment. Based on Lene Hansen’s Security as Practice2, 
I start with a premise that identity and foreign policy choices are intertwined. Therefore, I 
believe the changes in political actions regarding the questions of cooperation with the 
European Union and the unresolved status of Kosovo which will be addressed are telling 
in terms of identity change of Serbia. 
In order to highlight the process of Serbian identity change, an emphasis on 
identity construction/the process of othering and the discursive construction of the 
Balkans will be stressed. The hypothesis is that the process of Serbia’s transformation 
into a supposedly pro-European country is connected to Serbia’s particular perception of 
the European Union and its own political identity. The analysis looks at the ways in 
which the relationship between the European Union and Serbia figures in the Serbian 
political discourse and the way this construction shapes discourse on Serbian identity. 
Specifically, the study highlights two cases by focusing on how is national identity 
manifested in political practice: the nature of cooperation with the EU and the problem of 
unresolved territorial boundaries with Kosovo. The relationship between Serbia and 
Kosovo is chosen to help assess the manifestation of the EU in Serbian foreign politics 
and the role it plays in the shaping of Serbian identity. I believe each case study is closely 
connected to the understanding of Serbia’s political identity and policy choices in these 
areas are the most telling in terms of Serbia’s identity transformation. How is Serbian 
identity reconstructed within a broader framework of European integration and Serbia’s 
relationship with the Kosovo?  
 
1.1 Contribution of the study 
Using a poststructuralist theorisation on identity and discourse analysis, this paper 
analyses the representation of Serbian identity by the Serbian political elites. It seeks to 
map out how Serbian identity is being discursively reproduced in relation to European 
integration processes and broader transformation processes in the post conflict period. It 
                                                          
2
 Hansen 2006 
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seeks to capture changes in Serbian politics through awareness of the role of identity in 
political decisions and vice-versa. The main contribution of this study is that it attempts 
to shift away from an incentive perspective on the European integration and to contribute 
to a growing field of studies focused on the role of identity in politics. Awareness of 
processes of identity construction and re-construction in Serbia can help with producing 
other insights into the on-going transformation processes in the Western Balkans. 
 
1.2 Serbia and the European Union –power relationship 
Since the focus is on the changing character of Serbian identity seen in the light of 
political changes, and discussion on the influence of the European Union as an actor of 
change, it would be beneficial to acknowledge the existing power relations between these 
political actors. I assume that these two political subjects, the EU and Serbia, do not have 
an equal position since the EU finds itself in a position to “dictate” the conditions which 
have to be met and to which Serbia must react to if the country wishes to join the EU. 
Therefore, the EU sets an environment for a new type of discourse on the Serbian 
political identity. The evolving relationship between the EU and Serbia is in my view 
changing the character of Serbian politics from the isolationist foreign policy of Slobodan 
Milosevic and his leading party in the 1990s to the foreign policy of cooperation, whether 
with international institutions or regional actors. The role of the European Union will be 
thus to act as a broader political framework for my analysis.  
 
1.3 Epistemological and ontological positioning 
As many other IR schools of thoughts, poststructuralism finds itself divergent in its nature 
and offers a wide array of perspectives on how to address reality.  In a very broad sense, 
poststructuralist scholars take on an anti-positivist understanding of the social reality. 
Ontologically, interpretation and understanding is favoured against causal mechanisms 
and laws. Knowledge is understood as social and context is important when one wants to 
make sense of the world around them. Interpretative epistemology is reflected in 
poststructuralist methodological underpinning which stresses the role of language in 
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explaining the social world and so poststructuralism can be defined as a qualitatively 
orientated research method.
3
 
In terms of further epistemological and ontological positioning the thesis works with 
poststructuralist theory, which in terms of broader assumptions about identities mean they 
are understood as unstable and changing; evolving and capable of taking up an altered 
character. The foundation principle of this study is that the central subject of an analysis, 
Serbian identity, lacks a stable core. Serbian identity is seen as a “subject in process” 
where subject’s identity is reconstructed within a certain political setting. The proposed 
research therefore questions the singularity and homogeneity of what constitutes Serbian 
and pays attention to how Serbian political elite presents what Serbia is in the political 
discourses. In order to clarify chosen methodological approach to the studied 
phenomenon, focus is on the poststructuralist understanding of identity and the 
relationship between “the subject” and “the other”.  
 
1.4 Research Question and Thesis Structure 
The changing nature of Serbian identity in the post-Milosevic era is analysed by utilising 
the poststructuralist framework with an emphasis on identity construction and taking the 
prospect of EU membership as a wider political framework of analysis. Special focus is 
paid to discursive changes that have appeared in relation to the cooperation with the EU 
and the unresolved status of Kosovo.  By questioning how Serbian policy choices have 
been changing during the course of Serbian post-conflict transition, the thesis aims to 
provide a lesson about the complexity of political change and identity formation. In 
words of Charles Tilly, identities presented in this research are seen as “always 
contingent, always negotiable, but also always consequential” and “when political 
identities change, so do a wide range of other meaning, practices and relations”.4 The 
purpose of the study is to analyse the process of re-construction of Serbian identity and 
how is the EU involved in the process. The aim is to address the following research 
questions: 
 
                                                          
3
 Fawcett 2008 
4
 Tilly 2003: 611 
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1. How is Serbian identity being discursively presented by the Serbian political elites in 
the post-conflict period? 
2. What role does the EU play in the process of identity construction? 
 
The following theoretical chapter will present some central topics which I believe should 
be addressed when analysing Serbia’s changing political identity. It will serve as a 
foundation for the selected case study of Serbia´s attitude to Kosovo in relation to co-
operation with the EU. The role of Serbian “other” and the geopolitical meaning of the 
Balkans will be discussed in order to better understand the complex character of identity 
and political change. The thesis will introduce important political developments marking 
Serbia´s transformation of its political identity and opening towards the European Union. 
The focus will be on the process of othering of Serbia´s past represented by Milosevic´s 
regime and attempts of new Serbian political representatives to shift country´s political 
roadmap westwards. Arguably, political action takes place in a certain political space. 
Therefore, the focus will be also on the meaning of the Balkans as a geo-political region 
and positioning of Serbia into a specific regional structure as perceived by the EU and 
what are the implications of such categorization. The nature of an old regime, with its 
implications on formulations of Serbian other, will be presented in order to better 
understand why Kosovo is the central reference point when it comes to transformation of 
Serbian political identity from the negative connotation as a conflict prone Balkan 
country towards pro-European country. I will argue that Kosovo serves as a nodal point 
of reference in the European discourse determining Serbia´s position in Europe – as it is 
currently in a state of limbo between the West and the Balkans. As will be illustrated, 
such articulation acquired a stable position in the official discourse by the European 
political representatives. The focus will be on the contrasting nature between the deeply 
rooted anti-Kosovar discourse in the Serbian politics and the pressure by the EU to accept 
Kosovo´s independence it in order to be considered ready to be accepted into Western 
structures. Overall, this study of re-construction of Serbian political identity within a 
framework of cooperation with the EU will hopefully reveal a fragment of the complex 
nature of relationship between identity and political change. 
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2 Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
2.1 Introducing poststructuralism 
Poststructuralism refers to an array of theoretical viewpoints.
5
 When it comes to the 
constitution of social reality, as an antimetaphysical and antihumanist school of thought, 
it stresses the importance of language.
6
 In this sense it shares some characteristics with 
structuralism. Poststructuralism emphasises the operation of language, it focuses on how 
the language shapes, reflects and reveals social phenomena.
7
 Language on a political 
level has an ability to justify often questionable political steps and naturalize the 
meanings until they become to be perceived as certain and are thus not questioned in 
terms of their legitimacy.
8
 Such hegemonic construction is for example a statement 
“Kosovo is Serbian” to which attention will be paid and its implications for the political 
which acquired a taken for granted quality in Serbian nationalist discourse.    
Although as in any other schools there is variation among the ideas each of them 
presents, central focus themes can be identified.
9
 First, a subject’s existence develops its 
identity not by being self-aware of ‘I’ but by deriving it from its position in language or 
its participation in other systems of signification. Second, focus on intertextuality is paid, 
which means all texts are interrelated as language relies on earlier discursive structures. 
In this sense, intertextuality refers to “how a text responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks 
past texts, and in doing so helps to make history and contributes to wider processes of 
change”.10  Intertextuality is also linked to the process of social change since it can 
stabilise the dominant discourse (social order) or challenge it. Third, all meanings are 
fluid and thus authors stress the shifting nature of meanings.
  
Also, in terms of the relation 
of language to empirical reality, language in use is linked to social processes.
 11  
Deployment and understanding of discourse varies accordingly. For example, 
Derrida’s understanding of discourse  and deconstruction offered a new way how to look 
                                                          
5
 Fawcett 2008: 667  
6
 Schwandt 2007: 238-239  
7
 Phillips & Hardy 2002 : 6 
8
 Laclau & Mouffe 1985 
9
 Schwandt 2007: 238 
10
 Fairclough 1992: 102 
11
 Faber 2003; Chreim 2006 
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at text.
 12
 In simplified terms, when we look at a structure of any text, we can see that the 
structure has some boundary (although uneven) which is limited by a centre serving as a 
guiding term explaining the nature of the structure. An intending person (who can be an 
author of the text) brings center to its existence but it is not the center itself since it is 
always on the outside of the intentional structure. The Centre is not really the centre, 
Derrida argued, as the centre arranges a particular structure without being in the structure. 
In Western culture, this centre is believed to be human consciousness. Human 
consciousness is therefore understood as an agency from which everything derives.  But 
in Derrida’s theorisation, language comes after man. He sees the world as linguistic. 
When language displaces the man, everything becomes a discourse. He asserts the 
language while removing it at the same time. Language is manifested in speech and it is 
seen as not merely communicative, but also constitutive of the social world – social 
identities and relations. It is “ambiguous, indeterminant, and replete with taken-for-
granted meanings”.13 His theorisation of inside/outside of the subject will be indirectly 
used for my own analysis. Also his deconstruction as an approach to text reading objects 
to the logic of fixed categories like East/West, which I will discuss in relation to the 
Balkans. Instead of seeing these categories as binary oppositions, they should be 
understood as whole, both including and excluding at the same time.
14
 These Derrida’s 
central aspects of his thinking can be applied to political issues, and he is often referred to 
as a writer known for providing “an ethnical turn” in thinking about texts, since 
academics appraise deconstruction from an ethical standpoint , how it is moving from 
subjectivity and totality to openness.
15
  
  Other writers, Laclau and Mouffe, developed discourse theory which argues for 
the necessity to recognize the unstable character of social identities and that meanings 
depend on the discourse.
 16
 Discourse is constitutive of the social – the social is therefore 
a discursive construction.
17
 The consequence is that there is a constant effort and struggle 
to define identity. The writers agree that sings (identities) obtain their meanings through 
difference, but this difference depends on the nature of relations between the signs. If we 
position the signs in different relations to each other, their meanings might change. 
                                                          
12
 Derrida in Bass 1998: 278-294  
13
 Mathison 2005: 105  
14
 Lockyer 2004: 243-244  
15
 Devine 1993 
16
 Laclau & Mouffe 1985 
17
 Kress & van Leuven 2001 
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Attempts to grasp the meanings of signs by knowing in which relationship they are with 
other signs is what constitutes the basis of discourse analysis.
18
 Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory starts from a premise of instable language which does not allow for 
meanings to be fixed. Again, language plays an active role in creating and changing 
identities as well as social relations. Discourse is changing through interaction with other 
discourses which is known as discursive struggle. Each discourse presents a specific 
understanding of the social and it strikes to achieve hegemony over other discourses in 
order to fix the meaning of language in its own way.
19
 Meaning is partially fixed around 
nodal points, which serve as central signs around which other signs are ordered – the 
meaning of other signs depends on their relationship to nodal points.
20
 Also, nodal points 
have sense only within a particular discourse. What discourse excludes is called the field 
of discursivity. This field offers multiplicity of meanings which can change discourse and 
the meaning of the signs can be temporarily fixed.  
  
2.2 Understanding identities 
Poststructuralism has enriched the field of IR with its theorisation of identity. According 
to poststructuralist theorisation of identity, identities are not given, but constructed, and 
the process of construction happens via discourses. Secondly, identities are unfixed.
 21
 
Thirdly, identity construction relies on a difference: it is against the difference of other on 
which identity formation builds.
22
 Often, violent form of the articulation of identity takes 
over a less violent version. This is what David Campbell refers to as “the radical 
interdependence” of political identities.23 Therefore, when analysing Serbian identity, we 
assume the identity of the studied object is a result of a complex process of interactions 
between self and other. One establishes his/her own identity through the establishment of 
contrast and difference. Identities are thus seen as a result of practices of othering: 
 
“In simplified terms this means that the sources of our identities exist outside of us; they are 
created through those images with which we identify and through the linguistic order that assigns 
                                                          
18
 Laclau & Mouffe in Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 5-7 
19
 Ibid. 7 
20
 Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112 
21
 Laclau and C. Mouffe 1985 
22
 Derrida 1998 
23
 Campbell 1996 
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names and terms to these images. Our identities are thus created through a series of identifications 
and relations with significant others but also through collective cultural discourses or narratives 
such as those of nation, religion, and sex”.24 
 
Indeed, identity studies are becoming a growing area of interest in all social 
sciences.
25
 When we talk about identity, one could spend several pages explaining the 
concept, since the question of identity can arise in many different ways. For the purpose 
of this study, however, social level is taken: belonging to a particular national 
community. National identity will be understood as an imagined community which is 
constituted around a central nodal point, which represents identity of community by 
stating its boundary/limit by the presence and through contrast with ‘other’.26 National 
identities, as other social identities, will be therefore understood as discursively produced 
and reproduced. Along with Hall and Anderson, Serbian nation will be understood as an 
ideological and linguistic construction created through imagination, which is a product of 
historical discursive processes.
27
 Based on Hansen and Waever’s book European 
integration and National Identity
28
, I take the concepts of “nation-state-Europe” not as 
“ideal types” but types in making which are “generated in specific national debate”, 
focusing on their usage and constructions in national debate. For example, in Fields of 
Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990, 
Anastasia Karakasidou's  presents an idea that Greek nationalism invented Macedonia as 
Greek, as part of the construction of Greek national self-identity.
29
 Similarly, among 
competing national claims, part of Kosovo became seen by Serbs as part of Greater 
Serbia. Therefore, when I talk about the nation, I understand nation as a unit continually 
in the making, and national identity as “a process rather than outcome”.30 Also, the 
construction of difference “us” versus “them” will be analysed as part of the discursive 
construction since the articulation of national identity is also reflected in its relationship 
with the other. I focus on symbolic production/reproduction of Serbian nationhood and 
how is nationhood reflected in the political discourse by utilising the stated 
                                                          
24
 Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking 2011: 8 
25
 Huddy 2011: 127 
26
 Anderson 1983; Glasze 2007: 662 
27
 Hall 1993; Anderson 1993 
28
 Waever & Hansen 2002 
29
 Karakasidou 1997 
30
 Keith & Pile 1993: 28 
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poststructuralist theories of identity formation and discourse theory as two key theoretical 
concepts. 
Coming back to writers influencing poststructuralist theorising on identities and 
discourse, Foucault’s understanding of identity questions the individual subjectivity by 
stressing institutional practices through which individuality is produces.
 31
 An individual’s 
social identity relies not on an individual experience, but on a social representation which 
is collective - shared among a specific social group – constraining how individual acts.32 
Foucault understands discourse as a system of social relations and practices, where 
political action and policy also constitutes a discourse. He argues that truth is determined 
by different regimes of knowledge in a process of discursive construction and it is power 
which constitutes discourse. In this sense, universal truth is unattainable because we can 
never stand outside of discourse as we represent a particular regime of knowledge. The 
relationship between the social and the linguistic is one of constant mediation. Social and 
political reality is constituted by discourse and discourse is at the same time constituted 
by it.
33
  
 When it comes to Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theorising on subject, they argue the 
subject is never autonomous, since it has a specific position within discourse which 
designates how subject should act.
34
 Moreover, since there are many different competing 
discourses which give subject different positions, subjects are fragmented. Subjects are 
also overdetermined because due to the nature of discourses - they acquire multiple 
subject positions (for example soldier-Serb-Christian).
35
 Identity is therefore established 
relationally, through chains of equivalence which links together different signifiers.
36
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, identity is acquired in a process of representation via a 
group of signifiers with a central nodal point and it is being constantly “accepted, refused 
and negotiated in discursive processes”.37 In our case, the discursive construction of 
Serbian points towards what Serbian equals and what it differs from. For example, the 
prevalent discourse on nationalism during the Milosevic presidency equated Serbian with 
                                                          
31
 Foucault 1972   
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Foucault 1972 
34
 Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 11 
35
 Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 41 
36
 Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 127 
37
 Ibid. 43 
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signifiers such as strength, Christian, soldier and contrasted it with Albanians in relation 
with weakness, Muslim, perpetrator of violence, etc.
38
  
In terms of collective identities, group identities enable some possibilities of 
identification while reducing/ignoring others. They serve to dissolve the boundaries 
between different social groups or different interests by “relating them to a common 
project and by establishing a frontier to define the forces to be opposed, the enemy”.39 In 
Serbian war society, everyone who was not Serb was put into a specific category as non-
Serb, whether he or she was Croat, Albanian, etc. What is problematic with such 
classification is that any internal differences within the group formations are ignored (for 
example, Serbian women and Croatian women might have more in common that Serbian 
men and Serbian women).
40
  
According to Laclau, group and representation are formed at the same time, 
offering an understanding of society as a whole.
41
 In this study, focus is on the political 
representation of identity since political actors are the ones talk about/on behalf of the 
group. Especially relevant for the analysis is Laclau’s and Mouffe’s concept of social 
antagonism, when one identity excludes another. During the existence of Yugoslav state, 
one could be Serb and Yugoslav, Albanian and Yugoslav, Croat and Yugoslav at the 
same time. However, after the disintegration of the state, these identities related 
antagonistically to one another. The new discourse on national identity allowed people to 
fight those whom they previously considered to be fellow Yugoslavs, with whom they 
shared a common identity. This is what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as hegemonic 
articulation, when the hegemonic articulation of people as Serbs, Croats and Albanian 
replaced the articulation of people as Yugoslavs. Boundaries between the inside and the 
outside where established based on such antagonistic articulations. By stating these 
examples, one sees how political articulations of identity have social consequences.
42
  
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) and Mouzelis (1990) criticise Laclau and 
Mouffe for not taking into account structural relations of dependency (class, gender, 
ethnicity), which according to them explains “which social forces have greater capacity to 
effect articulatory changes and why”43. Laclau and Mouffe argue that change – 
                                                          
38
 Ronayne 2005: 57-59 
39
 Mouffe 1993: 50 
40
 Hall 1991 
41
 Laclau 1996:27 
42
 Laclau and Mouffe 1985 
43
 Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 125 
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hegemonic intervention – is possible for any social group since any social group has 
access to hegemonic discourse but they fail to explain how exactly political interest is 
constituted.
44
 Another point of departure when it comes to analysing national identity 
through political representatives is the question of who has power to represent the nation. 
I would like to emphasise that I acknowledge argument by Vasquez which says that 
political elites “control identity” and have “profound influence over life of society”.45 
Although it would be interesting to analyse how these relations of dependency influence 
discursive practices and to what extent representation reflects societal understands,
46
 such 
theorising will have to be omitted due to the limitations of research area. 
 Most of the poststructuralist work on identities is based on the contrast of 
difference between self/other. In the Serbian society a strong dichotomy between Serbs 
and Albanians will be evident. In this case, I will focus on issues constraining harmonious 
identity formations. However, according to Hansen and Waever, one should be also 
willing to take into account a less bipolar approach when it comes to identity formation.
47
 
Waever argues that the self/other dimension of identities emerges only in rare situations. 
What is problematic with a model of distinction between self and other is that it creates 
only two possibilities for an articulation of identity and is limiting in its nature. Such 
categorisation creates a clear image of an enemy. Therefore, I will also partly apply such 
distinction because I will argue that Europe in the Serbian political discourse and foreign 
decisions takes on a specific role of not quite self but not quite the other, taking the 
mentioned less bipolar approach for such articulation.
48
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Mouzelis 1990 
45
 Vasquez 1995: 223 
46
 Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 62 
47
 Waever & Hansen 2002 
48
 Waevar 2002: 24 
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3 Methodology 
  
The conceptual and methodological framework of the presented analysis is mainly based 
on poststructuralist discourse theory described in the previous part. To restate, the theory 
offers new ways of approaching identity in politics by paying attention to the construction 
of social meanings. It reveals that identities are formed on the basis of constitutive 
outside, known as ‘otherness’.49 Formulation of national identity, as other identity, is 
made through discursive construction of such difference. Serbian identity studied in the 
thesis is thus understood as relational, varied, and intertwined with discursive 
articulations.
50
 Discourse theory’s ontological frame is suitable for explaining identities’ 
changing and contingent character, which is the aim of the thesis with regard to Serbian 
identity. The frame offers a valuable perspective on the processes of identity 
reconstruction. Second, it also offers an insight into how specific articulation of the 
‘other’ fosters or hinders post-conflict reconciliation, which is relevant to the current 
nature of Serbian politics trying to come in terms with its recent conflict ridden past. 
Third, it highlights the relevance of identities to politics.
51
    
Poststructuralist methodology stresses the role of language and so it relies on 
qualitative research methods. Qualitative methods of research are especially suitable for 
those studies which wish to capture process and context, which is the goal of the thesis 
too.
52
 Discourse analysis as a chosen method of research involves analysis of the 
discursive constructions of Serbian identity by the political elites which helps to better 
understand complexities of the process of identity transformation. More specifically, I 
explore the ways in which Serbian identity is being constructed in the context of the 
European Union. Since language does not only reflect the social world but is constitutive 
of it, I assume that different articulations of how Serbia is presented in the political 
discourse offer different approaches to formulations of national policies. To put 
differently, when discourse changes, so does a wide range of social practices. 
 
 
                                                          
49
 Butler 1999 
50
 Hansen 2006 
51
 Nancheva 2012: 8-9 
52
 Devine 2002 
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3.1 Discourse Analysis 
Poststructuralist scholars recognize the power of discourse and the role it plays in shaping 
reality. They also acknowledge that social processes are arguably anything but stagnant. 
Discourse within this thesis is understood as a system of knowledge that “conveys the 
widely accepted generalizations about how society operates” and “the social norms and 
cultural values to which most of the people appeal when discussing their social and 
political problems and proposed solutions”.53 According to Kinvall, discourse in a 
poststructuralist sense can deal with “the way in which language, but also ideas and 
practices, produces knowledge and shapes human conduct according to that 
knowledge”.54 Moreover, discourses are interactive which means they are given a 
meaning when defined in relation to other discourses and thus we can talk about a 
mutually constitutive discourse agenda.  
Discourse analysis refers to a number of related methods that analyze text by 
focusing on language in use
55
, such as critical discourse analysis, discursive psychology, 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, etc. Therefore, the term discourse can be used in different 
sense depending on a discipline it emerges from (sociology, linguistic, philosophy, etc.).
56
 
Thus, discourse analysis offers several ways of analysing text and it can be used with 
both written and spoken data.
57
  
Discourse analysis has also enriched political studies with its insights into the 
discursive constructions and dynamics of identity formation.
58
 Its linkage with discourse 
theory has an implication for the way in which it combines meta-theoretical elements of 
discourse theory with an alternative methodology.
59
 The purpose of discourse analysis is 
to pay attention to constructions of social meanings, where discursive constructions of 
identities also belong to, to “map out the processes in which we struggle about the way in 
which the meaning of signs is to be fixed, and the processes by which some fixations of 
meaning become so conventionalised that we think of them as natural.”60 
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Central to this approach is language and the connection it creates between 
knowledge and social reality, “language used to do something and mean something, 
language produced and interpreted in a real-world context”.61 Special attention is paid to 
the language because language is in positivist understanding seen as something which 
describes the social reality but which also shapes it. As stated in the theoretical part, in a 
centre of discourse lie the so called nodal points which help to temporarily stabilise the 
meanings and also define other concepts. My nodal point is the European Union as it 
unifies different streams in Serbian politics and shapes the construction of Serbian 
identity. 
Discourse analysis goes further than merely describing texts; it questions how the 
studied text fits into a broader political setting. As a method, discourse analysis seeks to 
find patterns in discursive constructions and (political) context behind them.
62
 Building 
on Laclau’s and Mouffe’s understanding of discourse where everything social is 
contained within discourse and all social actions are discursive, the focus of the presented 
discourse analysis will be on a political process and the dynamism between language and 
political processes.
63
 The functional and normative use of discourse will be emphasised. 
The focus will be on discourse as social action, how political representatives use 
discursive construction and with what effect. Also, attention will be paid to those 
discursive constructions which appear to be true and taken for granted. Language will be 
understood as constitutive of social reality, helping with interpretation of the social world.  
Discourse analysis will be used to ‘‘recover meaning from the language 
that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena’’64. Specifically, I will use 
discourse analysis as a qualitative research method for investigating particular social 
phenomenon: Serbia’s identity transformation translated in political actions. I will 
illustrate how has the discourse on Serbian identity been changing with the growing 
interaction of Serbia with the European Union in the post-conflict Serbia, and what is the 
EU’s role in the construction of Serbian identity, taking into account wider geo-political 
setting. In terms of my analytical focus, I do not wish to present a systematic empirical 
analysis of texts, but instead attempt to grasp a more abstract and all-encompassing nature 
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of the discourses within Serbian political scene. In particular, I question how particular 
national discursive constructions limit Serbia´s possibilities for political action.  
In discourse analysis, theory and method are inseparable. Laclau and Mouffe are 
relevant for the chosen study because they stress the role of the political processes.
65
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, language is principally unstable and no meaning can be 
permanent. Discourse is understood as an open unit, and it interacts with and is being 
altered by other discourses. Each discursive unit attempts to stabilise the meaning of 
language in its own way and destabilise the other discourse which is understood as a 
discursive struggle.
66
  
For the analysis itself, political texts and talks/speeches by political 
representatives are selected in order to illustrate a complex process of the discursive 
construction of Serbian identity in the political sphere. I will seek to answer how Serbian 
identity is constructed in the political discourse by Serbian official representatives and in 
political acts within the broader EU integration process Serbia finds itself in. This means 
I will be looking at the texts in a spectrum of a wider political framework.  I will attempt 
to go beyond description and seek more complexity when it comes to understanding of 
Serbian identity transformation reflected in policy choices and nature of cooperation with 
other political units. At the same time, I will include a wide range of secondary sources to 
illustrate and discuss the complexity of the identity transformation and political 
challenges Serbia faces. Since I established discourse and social and mutually 
constitutive, I will be not analysing political speeches only, but the whole spectrum of 
political and identity related processes in Serbia. 
 
  Using Laclau and Mouffe’s theory in empirical analyses means being familiar 
with the following concepts: 
 
 Nodal points, master signifiers and myths, which can be collectively labelled 
key signifiers in the organisation of discourse; 
 The concept of chains of equivalence which refers to the investment of key 
signifiers with meaning; 
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 Concepts concerning identity: group formation, identity and representation; 
and 
 Concepts for conflict analysis: floating signifiers, antagonism and 
hegemony.
67
 
 
First, one should identify key signifiers in empirical material: nodal point. Nodal point 
around which the studied identity is organised is Serbian. As established in the previous 
sections, investigating identity in discourse analysis means looking at its linkage with 
other signs, whether in positive or negative sense. 
68
 Therefore, attention to binary 
constructions of the self and the other such as democratic, undemocratic, violent, 
peaceful, should be paid. Second, focus is on discursive organization of the signs – how 
are identified key signifiers combined with other sings? Moreover, since every 
construction (sign) can be linked to other constructions, it is necessary to see these 
linkages in a broader (political) framework. When such chain of signs acquires a 
temporarily stable position within the discourse, identities are also temporarily stabilised.  
Considering ontological foundations of poststructuralist though, it is impossible 
to answer what Serbia is, but it is possible to question how it came about – to focus on the 
process of identity construction. How is Serbian identity being discursively constructed in 
the process of identity construction? Since subject of analysis is looked at through its 
relation to “other”, how “other” is seen by “self” constitutes the very “self”. Discourses 
on “other” and discourse on “self” are thus mutually constitutive.  
The purpose of investigation is to reveal and identify the specific chains of 
meaning that a particular discourse brings together.
69
 An identity, as well as social space, 
is established in relation to something it is not – the Balkans is not Europe, Serb is not 
Albanian, etc. A social space ‘Balkans’ links a geographical part of Europe to signs 
‘civilisation’, ‘violence’, etc. In practical terms, analysis of the Serbian other which is 
created together with the creation of Serbian self points toward what discourse about 
Serbian self excludes and what are the social consequences of this exclusion. If, for 
example, ‘European’ in a given discourse is linked with ‘progress’, then I as the discourse 
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analyst can show how this pairing has been established discursively and what 
consequences it has for both ‘European’ and ‘Serbian’.   
The discourse on the enemy/other is anchored in binary oppositions like 
civilised/uncivilised, which are known as floating signifiers.
70
 Here again, the other’s 
identity constitutes outside, providing boundaries for the identity of the self.
71
 Identity 
depends on subject’s position within discourse: 
 
Whenever we use the category of “subject” in this text, we will do so in the sense of “subject 
positions” within a discursive structure. Subjects cannot, therefore, be the origin of social 
relations-not even in the limited sense of being endowed with powers that render an experience 
possible- as all “experience” depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility .72 
 
Floating means these signifiers do not have a fixed meaning – it changes with time. One 
of the floating signifier which will be reoccurring during the analysis is Europeanness. 
Both Serbian and European political statements are trying to fix the meaning of the term 
in their own particular way.  
When it comes to the selection of political speeches, most of them come from the 
chosen time frame after year 2000, focusing on the speeches during presidency of Boris 
Tadic. However, when it came to selecting texts for the study, texts from another period 
of time had to be used in order to increase my understanding of the broader political 
setting and identify the prevailing discursive constructions. I looked for those topics 
which were reoccurring in different texts, whether media reports or secondary sources 
quoting political speeches, paying attention to repetitions of existing discursive 
constructions. I selected texts on the basis of their availability which means I focused on 
those which can be widely read. As mentioned earlier, I worked with language on a 
political level since politicians and other state representatives have an authority to present 
official political positions. Various statements and speeches will be used to complete the 
analysis. 
 Methodologically, this study can be principally regarded as an analytical and 
qualitatively orientated work. It largely relies on the descriptive / qualitative data. A 
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content related analysis will be used instead of a linguistic analysis.
73
 The reason for 
choosing a content related analysis is due to focus on a broader relation between political 
realities and discourse. The aim is to look for patterns within a broader context, where 
language is seen as part of political processes.
74
 Specifically, I focus on the discourse of 
politicians. This study relies on wide range of secondary qualitative data gathered from 
numerous books, journals and reports. The process of transition is of enormous scope and 
thus it is not possible for one to grasp all the elements of such a complex issue. Therefore, 
our study analyses solely the political aspects of the process of transition. 
3.2 Reflexivity 
The aim of presented discourse analysis is not to discover the truth about reality but to 
describe how discursive struggle constructs reality - how Serbian political elites present 
Serbian identity so that it appears natural. For a discourse analyst, discourse becomes the 
object of analysis, not the reality, since reality cannot be reached outside discourse. One 
should instead look for patters in the text/speech and identify the social implications of 
dissimilar discursive representations of reality, paying attention to naturalised 
statements.
75
  
In terms of limitations of the study, official discourses will be used to study the 
process of identity construction since I am interested in constructions of Serbian identity 
at the decision-making level. It would be probably beneficial to look at the media 
discourse or public opinion surveys to complete the proposed research question, but I 
have decided to delimit my study to official political discourses because I already 
possessed some understanding of it. All in all, a complete closure is never possible and so 
the same research question remains opened to various interpretations.  
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4 The Milosevic era  
 
In order to provide an insight into what the post-conflict transition meant to Serbian state 
representatives, as they were the ones who are in a position to officially ascribe what 
transition is, the discourse of the old regime is important to consider. This is because the 
new political regime has some elements of the old regime yet it is also novel – 
positioning itself as somewhat in-between the past and present, characterised by a degree 
of relatedness.  
The 1990s started a period of political and diplomatic crisis in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia, a decade marked by years of ethnic violence, population dislocation 
and “hate-speech” rhetoric.76 The desire for national self-determination appeared to be 
stronger than the will to live in a multi-national state. It was a period when national 
identity and national sentiments shaped the formation of new states, in a rather violent 
way. New states’ declarations of independence often came in violence.77  
In Serbia, Milosevic´s political party exploited and instrumentalised what Griffin 
calls an illiberal form of nationalism. While nationalism can be understood as “an 
ideology whose affective driving force is the sense of belonging to and serving a 
perceived national community (and) the carriers of this ideology attribute to their nation a 
distinctive cultural identity which sets it apart from other nations and gives it a special 
place in the historical process”, illiberal nationalism is “fulfilled by a particularly intense 
form of affective attachments to one’s own homeland . . . or people, one often maintain 
through the demonization of other nations or out-groups, ethnic or otherwise, within the 
nation”.78 Another defining feature of the regime was its militant nature, where militarism 
embodied “a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in 
ways necessary to legitimate the use of force…”.79 Discourses and practices of militarism 
were also supported by the central role of the army in the state.  
  Discourse of Serbian nationalism is believed to cause a shift in general beliefs 
and values in ways that actually normalized the use of force.
80
 Political statements 
legitimised the use of force against those perceived as “the others” and began to construct 
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it as inevitable if the Serbian nation was to survive. Such representation of nationalism 
had deforming capacities on the state and perpetuated certain notions of identity which 
crystallised in the form of an ethnically defined nationalism and its hegemonic 
supremacy
81
. It was also a period when less visible process of hierarchism – of class and 
gender, took part.
82
 The impact of Milosevic’s nationalistic policies reached beyond its 
obvious manifestation in conflicts with the neighbouring states; it had also pervasive 
effects on economy and general livelihood options available to people.  
4.1 Serbia and “the Other” 
National identity, dependant on values and ideology, is hereby understood as “mental 
construct sustained in being by imaginative labour and discursive habit”.83 As established 
in the theoretical part, national identities are discursively reproduced with the 
construction of difference.
84
 Milosevic was able to create a feeling of threat among the 
population which helped him to form a vision of a unified national identity and support 
for his policies. The concentration of power in Milosevic’s hands was arguably possible 
because of a formulation of one prevailing national identity which defined itself in an 
opposition to “the other”.85 In the case of Serbian aggressive nationalist policies in the 
1990s, Milosevic’s political party kept stressing the difference between Serbian self and 
other (Albanian/Croatian/the EU/NATO/Muslim) which constituted outside of the 
nationhood.
86  
When it comes to Kosovo, discriminatory policies targeting the Albanian 
population and anti-Muslim propaganda fuelled an already tensed situation between the 
ethnicities. Stereotypes served to reproduce boundaries between an in and out group. One 
of the common prejudices was that Albanians would outnumber Serbs due their larger 
families.
87
 An analysis of Milosevic’s political discourse shows usage of dichotomies, 
where against the “passive” and “peaceful” Serbian stood the “aggressive” and “violent” 
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Albanians. These binary constructions made a significant impact on the population also 
because of their widespread usage in the media.
88
  
 
“Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity 
politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to 
the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat; [. . .]. What is shocking about these 
developments is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that they display but rather the 
atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and 
otherness.”89 
 
The solution to the dangerous “other” embodied by the Albanians was to incorporate 
Serbian minority living in Kosovo into ‘Greater Serbia’ at the expense of Albanians. This 
was problematic since Kosovo as “space/homeland” in a symbolic way was used as a 
marker of nationhood and it was regarded as homeland to both the Albanians and the 
Serbs. The bond between the nation and homeland was for both ethnicities strong, since 
each of the nations tied its uniqueness with the territory of Kosovo. On-going tensions 
related to different interpretation of the space in national history resulted in the Kosovo 
War.
90
  
Milosevic used a discourse on the historical statehood referring to the medieval 
Serbian kingdom and legitimacy and continuity of Serbian presence in the disputed area 
of Kosovo.
91
 The rhetoric of national territory was closely tied to the understanding of 
nationhood and was considered as one of the delimitating indicators of nationhood. 
Milosevic’s mythical interpretation of Kosovo as homeland to Serbs enabled an exclusion 
of those which were perceived as different / the other. Kosovo served as the nodal point 
for Serbian nationalism.  If one analyses the available political rhetoric, such nationalist 
mystification was crucial for such exclusion, since it gave moral justification to believe 
the Serbs were waging a “just war” and it was in their national interest and a matter of 
preserving “the Serbian”.92 This does not mean that nationalism causes violence but it 
means that nationalism can provide the values and symbols which make violence 
possible.   
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Analysis of national identity and its link to politics is especially relevant when it comes to 
ethnic violence and conflict. During the war, Albanians were portrayed not as individuals 
but as members of the other group.
93
 In cases like this, ethnic belonging and not 
belonging were used to distinguish who is and is not part of the nation. Milosevic’s 
approach to create a unified vision of Serbs built on a notion of “other”, whether on 
historical, geographical or cultural basis. "European," i.e., Serbian, was con- trasted to 
"oriental," i.e., Muslim
94
. Serbs also presented themselves as guardians of European 
values, stressing their European identity
95
: 
 
[.. .] the truth about Kosovo and Metohia has not changed much overtime, so that even 
today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knock-ing at the door of Kosovo and Metohia, is 
trying to approach Europe. It is hard to believe that Europe is not aware of this. Even those in 
Europe who do not hold Serbia close to their hearts know very well that this old Balkan 
state represents the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam.
96
 
 
It is sometimes argued that a great majority of Serbs justified the war as a form of 
protection from the dangerous Albanian ‘other’. At the end of the war, Kosovo was 
placed under the UN administration and political battle over the status of the territory 
began. The sense of injustice and victimisation resulting from Western military action 
towards Serbia and following presence in the disputed province in order to facilitate post 
conflict reconciliation created resistance towards European/Western powers.
97
 Anti-
European stance can be traced in the speeches made by Milosevic as well as the Serbian 
Orthodox Church.
98 Milosevic presented the Western intervention and involvement in the 
conflict as a causing factor for the destruction of the Serbian state. Legitimacy of EU´s 
democratic principles was openly criticised: 
 
“As you know yourselves, for a whole decade efforts have been under way to place the entire 
Balkans under the control of certain Western powers. Most of that work has been done by 
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installing puppet governments in certain countries, by turning these countries into countries of 
limited sovereignty or depriving them of any sovereignty.”99 
 
In order to conceptualise the process of Serbian post-war identity transformation, 
the Kosovo War and anti-Western attitudes should be understood as a regular point of 
reference when it comes to Serbian transition, since I believe the symbolism of it remains 
central to delimitation of present development regarding Serbian identity. The narratives 
of war are still alive and cannot be easily eradicated as discourse of Serbian victimhood 
prevailed in the immediate post-conflict years too, as will be later illustrated. Discourse of 
justice and responsibility for the war crimes became an integral part of the Serbian 
politics after year 2000.  
4.2 Milosevic’s foreign policy 
Arguably, Serbian foreign policy is affected by a specific view of Serbian national 
identity which affects the state’s political development. Political decisions produce 
discourse and therefore it is the political power (and those who represent the power) 
which has means to unify the discourse and decide what is credible when it comes to 
nation’s past/present. Discourse and political power are therefore intertwined. In this 
sense, historical/current events can be interpreted via determined identities/y in a specific 
way and rationalise a particular political response.   
It might be argued that Milosevic consistently deployed force and manipulation to 
dismiss internal contestation of the Serbian “self”. Milosevic´s attempt to create a 
singular national identity, the Serbian nation, was characterised by a clear delineation of 
belonging and not belonging. The concept of nation was postulated to constitute the 
inside and outside of Serbian nation and to draw boundaries between an inclusion and 
exclusion.
100
 At the same time, those remaining outside the drawn boundaries enabled the 
assertion of existing distinctions. Whether Milosevic’s vision of the nation were shared 
by the population or were forcefully imprinted on it, described articulations of national 
identity had an impact on the nature of state’s foreign relations. Serbia became isolated 
from the international economics and politics and post-Milosevic government had to deal 
with the consequences of its previous regime. A series of conflicts, nationalist wars, 
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international crisis, economic sanctions, and anti-Western sentiment following NATO's 
attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 have all negatively affected the Serbian society.
101
 
The impact of Milosevic’s political practices on Serbian identity had 
consequences on the reinforcement of ethnical identities while attempting to discursively 
define what Serbian national identity stood for. The argumentation underpinning Serbia’s 
right to Kosovo was focused on revival of national sentiments. By referring to a common 
tradition, Milosevic’s political regime produced a vision of a unified and homogenous 
Serbian identity. With the loss of public support, Milosevic, facing mounting pressure 
from the public movement, resigned. His resignation profoundly altered notions of nation 
and identity and opened a new space for re-definition of what it meant to be Serbian, to 
accept responsibility for the past.  
 I argue that it is important to take into account discourse of previous regime 
because discourses of Milosevic’s nationalist politics and post 2000 political 
developments are closely linked. In order to understand Serbia of today, one should 
therefore acknowledge the discursive interconnectedness with its previous regime, since it 
influenced the nature of political discussion in a domestic, as well as international scene. 
4.3 Change of power 
The next part will present the political events surrounding the demise of Milosevic and 
formation of a new government. It will serve to describe the political setting in Serbia in a 
chosen study period and to point towards the role of the country’s past in the construction 
of Serbian political identity.  
October 5, 2000, date that marks the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s regime, 
resulted in significant changes in the Serbian politics. In the presidential elections in 2000 
Milosevic was defeated by a coalition of opposition movements which lead to collapse of 
his authoritarian regime. Milosevic dominated Serbian politics and society for the whole 
decade from the 1990s, when he had taken control over the entire state apparatus, creating 
a powerful authoritarian regime. His legacy left Serbia as an outcast state, a blocked state 
and eventually, a bombed state. Serbia’s international standing and reputation suffered 
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greatly during the war and together with the worsening economic conditions and living 
standards it appeared to fuel anti – Milosevic sentiments.102  
Different social groups, political parties, opposition parties, culture elite, 
independent media led parallel processes to overthrow the leader. The result of these 
actions lead to a nearly twenty opposition parties and movements being brought together 
in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), the goal of which was an electoral defeat 
of Milosevic and an establishment of democracy. Members agreed to name Vojislav 
Koštunica as a presidential candidate, an opponent of Milosevic. On the 24th of 
September 2000, the opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica, defeated president in the first 
round of presidential election. Milosevic denied the results, claiming a tie. Reluctant to 
admit his defeat, he ordered to repeat the elections. This caused a huge wave of anti-
government demonstrations held in Belgrade, demanding Milosevic to admit his defeat in 
the first round. The next day, under massive public pressure, Milosevic officially stepped 
down.
103
  
Kostunica’s victory was to some extent a surprise for the whole Serbia, fearing 
Milosevic could manipulate the elections and "legitimately" continue his policy.
104
 The 
political change was believed to be a result of a strong anti-government campaign, the 
unity of opposition political parties and different NGOs which stressed the need for 
political, economic and other reforms that could transform Serbia and that were not 
possible until Milosevic would have been defeated. Therefore, the beginning of the new 
millennium was for many more than an end of a decade.
105
  
However, transition of power was not easy. The new government tried to 
rhetorically distance itself from the previous one and to construct a new image of Serbia 
in a domestic, as well as international setting. After all, trust in public institutions and 
state administration was low, the economic development stagnating, the rate of 
unemployment high and the state had also to deal with refugees and displaced persons.
106
 
The international isolation of the country manifested itself in imposed trade sanctions, 
limited travel options for the citizens, etc. Despite all the negatives, Vojislav Kostunica’s 
election as a new president was portrayed as a choice of the Serbian people to follow the 
                                                          
102
 ‘The End Of Milosevic’, 2000, Mc Geary, J., [online] 
103
 ‘10 years since fall of Milošević regime’, 2010, B92/Tanjug, [online] 
104
 ‘Elections Planned in Serbia As Shift in Power Takes Hold’, 2010, The New York Times, 
[online] 
105
 Bujosevic & Radovanovic 2003 
106
 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [online] 2000: 318 
 
 
 
31 
 
path of democracy. The international community seemed to be pleased with the promise 
of change the results offered, as well as the general public.
107
 At the same time, the 
government was required to do a number of things in order to be accepted as a lawful 
state by the international community.
108
 
 
4.4 Towards the reforms 
After the fall of Milosevic, who refused the international financial assistance programs 
and European programmes for transition and reconstruction, the relations between Serbia 
and the EU relatively rapidly intensified. At the beginning of a new millennium and the 
advent of democracy in Serbia, European integration has become a priority for the newly 
elected government. The Democratic Party subscribed to pro-European reforms and it 
was described as a symbol of Serbia’s fast changing direction from the troubled past into 
perspective, possibly European future.
109
  
The party promoted rapid and radical reform steps. The main priority was a rapid 
transformation and integration of Serbia into international structures, primarily the EU.  
In 2000, Serbia (then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)) joined the Process of 
Stabilization and Association, which included the possibility of future accession to the 
EU, but it was not bounded by any timeframe. Accession to the EU was made dependant 
on the speed of Serbia’s implementation of EU standards and norms. In 2004, parliament 
approved a resolution (Resolution on Joining European Union) and shortly afterwards 
implemented an Action plan for fulfilment of the European Commission 
recommendations.
110
   
 Despite all the progress that Serbia has made since 2000 in the democratic, 
economic and social areas, it took more than seven years until Serbia signed the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement.  This was due to the nature of questionable 
political and economic issues requested by the EU, of which the two most controversial 
ones were the cooperation of Serbia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the issue of Kosovo. In case of ICTY, the Serbian 
government had been repeatedly urged to issue wanted war criminals. Strong progress on 
this issue was recorded only after the new pro-Western government was elected in 2008. 
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This government helped to successfully track down and arrest Radovan Karadzic, the 
former leader of Bosnian Serbs, in July 2008 and General Ratko Mladic, who was 
captured in May 2011.
111
 Another burning question was the problem of Kosovo, where 
following the NATO bombings Serbia lost sovereignty over this territory, and Kosovo 
was placed under transitional UN administration. The consequence of international 
involvement was that Serbia remained a state with an undefined territory.
112
 The 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 led to strong protests 
in Serbia and bashing of legal independence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
which legally confirmed Kosovo’s autonomy.113  
 Using theorisation of identity, if we acknowledge all group identities are defined 
in opposition to the “other”, then identities can change when what constitutes the other 
changes too. The “other” is therefore constitutive for the group identity. After year 2000 
the discursive construction of Europe as Serbian other and enemy started changing 
towards more welcoming perceptions. People´s identification as European during 
Milosevic’s regime was limited because such possibility for identification was 
marginalised. Despite a problematic nature of the EU-Serbia relationship in the post-
conflict period, Serbia’s belonging to Europe began to be stressed, as speeches of 
president Kostunica illustrates:  
 
"Serbia has always been a part of Europe… no one can introduce Serbia to Europe, or 
take it out of there…  Serbia will be what she has always been, but without Slobodan Milosevic - a 
part of Europe."
114
 
 
Such statements reaffirm the centrality of Europe for Serbian identity by indirectly 
describing the European Union as the only possible future. The quotes also address a 
distinction the new government was trying to make – that it was Slobodan Milosevic, and 
his allies, who were responsible for Serbia’s isolation from Europe, and not the people, 
since “the whole country has risen to make one man, Slobodan Milosevic, leave”.115 
For Serbia, its perception as a perpetrator of war was presented as a result of Milosevic´s 
regime, not the Serbian population. One of the featured themes in the post-Milosevic 
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political discourse was assertion that Serbian population was not to be associated with its 
former leader and his politics of isolation and extreme nationalism. Political leaders 
emphasized the negative impact of concentration of power in one leader, stressing 
isolation and objectification of Serbia:  
 
“…some ten years ago, by most important yardsticks Yugoslavia was 
closer to the West European integration than any country of East Europe. Today, as a 
consequence of the policy conducted in the last decade of the twentieth century, it is 
behind them.”116 
 
The end of Milosevic´s government was to be interpreted as a metaphorical end of the 
past. Expectations to join the European Union after the change of power were high.
117
 
The official Serbian political discourse presented Serbian identity as European and 
unquestionably belonging to Europe. Nevertheless, an approval of-from the European 
Union was needed if such articulations were to be made legally recognisable. However, 
the EU and Serbia´s visions of what it means to be European often clashed, as will be 
illustrated on a case study of Kosovo.  
To sum up, political transition is a complex and complicated process. The new 
leading parties in the post-Milosevic era have been trying to shift the direction of the 
previous isolationist government towards a more opened and Western orientated Serbia. 
After the conflict, a fast integration into the European structures was expected.
118
 
However, the process of constructing a different Serbia, whether in international or 
domestic setting, was nothing but smooth. Each Serbian election after 2000 were seen by 
the international community as an opportunity for Serbia to “shed its rogue image”.119 
Paul Hoyot describe rough states as those “lacking in principles and morals” … having no 
respect for the international system, preferring to disrupt instead what exists”.120 The 
Serbian political representatives themselves pointed towards a sense of mistrust they felt 
from Europe, as a result of Serbia’s previous regime’s wrong-doings: 
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“We in Belgrade, and Podgorica, are aware that there continues to exist certain 
mistrust and that we are expected to provide new confirmations of the seriousness and 
irreversibility of the changes in our country.”121 
 
I argue that the identification of Serbia as a rogue state or a state not to be trusted which 
made the international community treat it as “culturally inferior” ought to be looked at 
through deeper discursive constructions of the whole region to which Serbia 
geographically belongs to, the Balkans, as inferior. 
 
5 The civilisation discourse and The Balkans 
According to the theoretical underpinning stated in the previous sections, political action, 
as other social actions, takes place within a certain discursive setting. Mapping of the 
Serbian political discourse shows the Balkans is one of the principal constituents of 
Serbian political space. Reference to the Balkans is found in many political speeches and 
it serves as a concept which helps to define the discourse on Serbian identity.  
The analysis suggests that the Balkans is understood not only as a geographical 
space, but a civilisation region. In line with the poststructuralist theorising on discourses 
mutually constitute each other, the next part will illustrate how the Balkans is constructed 
in the European discourse, and what implications such construction have. How is the 
Balkans perceived and how is the Balkans discursively constructed? What makes its 
boundaries? 
 
5.1 The dynamics of identity construction from the outside 
Robert Kaplan in his book "Eastward to Tartary” argues that the main issue we should be 
paying attention to when it comes to analysis of the Balkans is an existence of “two 
Europes”.122 He argues that what we are currently witnessing is an existence of two 
entities, Europe and the Balkans, ideologically merged into one Europe, but distinctively 
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different. This leads to an emergence of two Europes - a wealthier Europe that includes 
the former NATO countries and a poorer and unstable Europe which includes much of 
the former Yugoslavia. Arguably, a cultural, historical, economic and development divide 
is greater now than it was several years ago. Europe is splitting into two distinct regions, 
similarly to a previous divide between the Ottoman and Holy Roman empires.   
Such construction of the Balkans as a place where conflicts and wars take place is 
common in the Western discourse. According to cited Samuel Huntington, the Balkans 
composition of cultures and religions makes it “destined” to remain conflict-prone. He 
argues that internal heterogeneity of the region does not lead to peaceful coexistence of 
those living in it.
123
 Huntigton argues for a new division of Europe based on the culture - 
a division between Western Christianity, Orthodox Christianity and Islam
124
. He claims 
that each of them needs to have an enemy to get a society mobilised, to fight for higher 
values, and continue strength of the civilisation. The Balkans is here understood in both 
geographical and civilisational terms. Thus, for Western understanding of the region, a 
civilizational-discourse meaning of the term is often stressed.
125
 
The ancient hatred argument puts the Balkans in a same position as Huntigton, 
constructing it as a place where century old conflicts resurface over time. 
126
 Discourse of 
historical determinism was used to simplify the conflicts which emerged to be known as 
Balkan wars. In the 1990s, thus, Balkan emerged as a pejorative term describing geo-
politics of the region as violent due to its inherited inclination towards violence.
127
  
However, it should be noted that the narrative of ancient hatred is not found in the 
Western discourse only. The Milosevic regime used the elements of ancient hatred thesis 
when explaining political steps necessary to “undo” ancient wrongs.128 As discussed 
before, the symbolism of Kosovo as a place where Serbia lost its political entity, power 
and freedom and became dominated by a foreign culture was used as propaganda for 
nationalist mobilization in the 1990s and as such used representation of a naturalised 
conflict between Serbs and Albanians.
129
  
The Balkans as a geographical region has defined borders. However, from a 
civilizational position, it is often referred to as a place in-between, creating imaginary 
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borders between the East and West of Europe in a normative sense.
130
 Politically, the 
Balkan countries are constructed as both same and different than Europe. The imposed 
identity of being in-between two contrasting civilisations is something that Serbian 
political elites distance themselves from. The tendency of official discourse is to place 
Serbia in the same position as the rest of the European states who are members of the 
European Union, and so indirectly to stress it’ s non-Balkan civilizational identity. In an 
interview for French Le Figaro, president Tadic stressed how Serbia naturally belongs to 
Europe and thus the membership in the European Union is seen as country’s destiny. He 
stated that 
 
 “… the EU membership is a natural destiny for Serbia, we are a European people, our 
geographic sphere and our culture are European.”
 131
  
 
This reoccurring discursive construction of describing Serbia as European signals how 
European and Europeanness become central to the discourse and shape the relationship 
between Serbia and other European states. Some authors would suggest that emphasising 
“European” instead of “Balkan” Serbia is the result of negative usage of the Balkans by 
the international community which made it “one of the most powerful and widespread 
pejorative designations in modern history” portraying the Balkans as the “other” of 
Europe. 
132
 According to Larry Wolf, this is because Europe needs to imagine and 
construct the other in order to construct its own identity. 
133
  
Apparently, the Balkans is constructed in the Western discourse in a negative 
sense, carrying the burden of violent past into the present days. As illustrated, the region 
has been also notoriously described as violent and unstable due to a series of historical 
violent events. The ancient hatred rhetoric prescribes the region an unfavourable position 
in Europe – designated to be violent and conflict prone. The Balkans, according to some 
authors, became a metaphor of violence.
134
 Such “balkanism” is constructed around 
certain binary opposition, such as developed/underdeveloped, civilised/uncivilised, etc. 
The West/Europe has positive qualities while the East/Balkans figures as having negative 
traits. Both terms are mutually constitutive.  
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5.2 Europe’s Other 
Foreign perceptions of the Balkans should be also considered since based on the 
theoretical part national identities are determined both from inside and outside. I assume 
the construction of a Balkan identity from outside influences the policies towards this 
region. Arguably, the positioning of Serbia into the Western Balkan states has therefore 
consequences for the Serbian political space. Geographical boundary here carries deeper 
political demarcations of what is and is not desirable, possible and impossible. The 
discursive construction of the Balkans is therefore important to address because it marks 
the political space in which Serbia acts.  
Does the EU take the Balkans as part of in-group or put-group unit? The Western 
Balkans appears to be positioned in between the EU. Some references suggest it is a geo-
political space which differs from the European democratic states and it lack behinds the 
standards when it comes to values they adhere to. The EU and the Balkans are in this case 
perceived as mutually incompatible. The European construction of the region positions it 
as inferior and lacking in terms of values, institutions, etc. Overall, the Balkans appears to 
be described as the most underdeveloped European region and as a region deficient in 
political and socio-economic progress when compared to other European regions.
135
 After 
all, the Western Balkan countries were put together into one category when it comes to 
EU’s regional policies because of their weaker state institutions, conflict ridden past, etc. 
and required to comply with a specifically designed set of norms. Such symbolic division 
of Europe imposes a sense of otherness to the Balkan states.
136
 At the same time, regional 
association is presented as a positive feature of current Serbian political direction. EU 
membership is portrayed as a possible future for all the countries of the Western Balkans 
region.
137
   
Neumann refers to portrayals of the regions as the Balkans as discursively 
invented, with political actors being the creators.
138
 He also stresses the invention of the 
common regional past (violent Balkan Peninsula) and the process of othering in negative 
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sense (I am Serbian to an extent I am not Croatian) which positions nations in an 
antagonistic relationship. Following his argumentation, the sense of difference between 
the nations is being constructed in dynamic processes of socialisation and othering. 
139
 
Whether the political leaders accept or reject the term Balkan as a negative Western 
construct, they have to react to existing labelling.
140
  
Many scholars try to demystify the sense of the Balkans, showing that it means 
more than a peninsula of these negative associations. They are pointing towards a shared 
culture which is identifiable, although at the same time there are many different people 
with a very strong sense of national identity that differentiate it from the other people they 
share their space with.
141
  
Transitional experience of Serbia itself has been marked by a constant reminder 
of the violent pass, stressing its role in the Yugoslav conflict. Therefore it is possible to 
ask a question how long such negative construction and demarcation of the region as 
Europe’s “other” can remain a hegemonic construction. According to Waever, it is 
Europe’s own history which constitutes Europe’s other, not any geographical part of it. 
Europe, constructed as civilised and peaceful, has history of violence which cannot be 
localised to one particular region. It is this violent past which Europe should come in 
terms with, not victimisation of the Balkan people as sole perpetuators of conflicts in 
Europe.
 142
 Nowadays, the image of progressive Europe is present in the national 
discourse. Europe is seen as model of development ought to be followed. The negative 
elements of European history (colonialism, wars, totalitarian regimes, etc.) are mostly 
omitted from the Europeanization discourse and Europe is therefore constructed as an 
ideal model to follow, taking into account only its “peaceful” post-World War II 
history.
143
  
I agree with the vision that the Balkan state are seen as balancing between the 
difference and similarity; it is the other within, wishing to join the European structures 
but at the same time seen as unstable.
144
 As a metaphor, the Balkans can be used and 
sometimes misused for political purpose. Specific discourse of the Balkans thus provides 
a space for interpretation of political actions and attitudes towards the region.  
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As established above, the relation between the West and the Balkans was often 
defined as a relation of opposition.
145
 Nowadays, Serbia is neither a “traditional” Balkan 
state in a pejorative term as it has managed to stick to certain principles of cooperation 
but it is not fully Western yet because it is not a member of the EU (NATO). The 
construction of the Serbian “self” in the political discourse is in the process of 
transformation from the dominant conflict-prone vision of the nation (Milosevic’s radical 
nationalistic Serbia), into Western disputably civilised nation. In an interview with 
Euronews, president Tadzic clearly distanced Serbia from an ‘old’ Serbian regime of 
Milosevic, and stressed its democratic projection, where he stated: 
 
“... we had a democratic revolution in Serbia… 16 years ago, that was a government of 
Slobodan Milosevic…”146 
 
However, in time of crisis, such as were the protests over Kosovo’s independence, Serbia 
is described as still vulnerable to a step back into its “dark” past:  
 
“when they speak positively about us, they call us South East Europe. And when they 
don’t, we are simply Balkans…”147 
 
Arguably, transformation of the whole region, Serbia included, offers two alternatives – 
the positive development towards the Western structures and backward negative 
transformation towards the “Balkan” past. Thus, within the political discourse, one can 
distinguish patterns of the Western and the Balkan alternative
148
: 
 
“Serbia has to choose between its nationalist past and a European future.”149  
 
 In the context of regional development, the memories of war remind the states of their 
violent past, but prospect of EU membership offer to former Yugoslav states another 
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option. Again, old constructions of West as rational and enlightened while Balkans as 
passionate and irrational emerges, although in new light.
150
 
The regions position vis-à-vis Europe is often used in respective national political 
discourses and such the Balkans-Europe dichotomy has been often used in concrete 
political programmes and election campaigns. Work of Todorova presents how such 
negatively is Balkan identity constructed in the discourse of local political elites.
151
 
Belonging to Balkan, being part of it is either accepted or rejected is imposed on the 
neighbouring states in order to distinguish their own identity as European.
152
 
Europeanness and Balkannes are put into a sharp contrast. The Balkans is constructed 
through a discourse that associates progress with EU.
153
 At the same time, it becomes 
Europe’s “antithetical periphery”.154 However, writers like Ole Weaver would question 
whether something like European Other within Europe’s geographical borders exists. He 
prefers to use the term “less-Europe” than anti-Europe when it comes to societies finding 
themselves on the borders of Europe, where Serbian society is often said to belong.
155
 
Therefore, he offers alternative approach to identity formation which is less strict and 
more opened towards alternative identity formation. 
In practical terms, the position of Serbia as part of the Western Balkans region in 
the European politics means for the changing nature of its political identity a need to 
improve its relations with neighbouring states with which it was in conflict. Serbian 
politicians aspire to distance Serbia from being perceived as a conflict prone Balkan state, 
and to accept foreign policy decisions that would bring it closer to EU membership: 
“the future of the Balkans (Serbia) lies in the EU”156 
In some cases, the European decisions were perceived as unjust and they often lead to an 
atmosphere of unease among the Serbian political elites and the general public. The 
reoccurring theme in the press releases was postulated around the question of how much 
would Serbia have to give up in order to be accepted into the EU. The cost of joining the 
EU was described as high to pay: 
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“the moral price to be in international community was extremely high...”157 
 
Pro-European political parties found itself in a difficult position of how to present the EU 
requirements as justifiable and beneficial to the state in a long term perspective. 
Following Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, nodal point “the EU” around which construction 
of new post-conflict Serbian identity is being shapes carries a specific set of signifiers 
such as state, democracy, justice, human rights, etc. which are given meaning in relation 
to the European Union. These are then articulated in the Serbian political sphere as either 
compatible or not compatible with the proposed visions of norms. What appears to be 
stressed by the Serbian politicians is a need to be patient with the transformation process 
since country´s democratic orientation does not have a long establishment and 
normalization of pro-democratic values takes time and dedication: 
“Our democracy is young and frail and it must gain as many friends and defenders as possible.”158 
 To conclude, the Balkans was usually thought of in terms of violence, ethnic 
rivalry, fragmentation. Constructing the Balkans as barbaric/violent/uncivilised 
naturalized the position of its people as outsiders of Western civilisation. It is interesting 
to observe how even today Balkan equalises anti-European. These two terms are being 
used as mutually exclusive and reproduce the West and East separation. What is also 
interesting to mention is that Serbia, along with other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, used 
the notion of “the West” to explain the Self and differentiate it from other ethnic 
groups.
159
 Nowadays, there is a contradiction in the use of the term Balkan within the 
Serbian political discourse. On one hand, Serbia is in a way forced to accept the Balkans 
as a region with defined geographical boundaries, a region to which it belongs. On the 
other hand, Serbia also attempts to distance itself from such belonging and describes it as 
a matter of the troubled past, where the Balkans is often equalised with Milosevic. Serbia 
therefore seems to be accepting its geographical position but distancing itself ethically 
from the past. Also, Europe’s role as a standard setter for Serbia, in spite of many divided 
opinions on some matters, is strong. EU membership is described as something belonging 
to the future while the Balkan of the 1990s is constructed as Serbia’s past. Ultimately, the 
                                                          
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Tadic, 15th September 2008, Belgrade, speech given on the International Day of Democracy in 
Dobric 2009 
159
 Lazić 2004: 195 
 
 
 
42 
 
discourse on the Balkans shows how space and belonging can be interpreted differently in 
political realms. 
   
5.3 The European Union and Serbia  
Identities as social categories are defined in opposition to each other, as established in the 
theoretical part. In terms of process of othering in the EU, the region Western Balkans is 
sometimes used in the EU discourse as reminder of “Europe’s past” which can be only 
overcome by region’s integration into the current EU structures. To some extent, the 
Balkans seems to replace what Central and Eastern Europe once was. The discourse of 
new/old Europe is present in the current debates surrounding Serbia’s transition and it is 
often this difference between the past and the presence which is used in political speeches 
on both sides, by Serbia and the EU simultaneously.  
European Union indirectly allows for an alternative scheme of identification, 
which presumes a shared vision of values and norms irrespective of ethnicity/nationality. 
Arguably, the problem is that no distinct European identity is distinguishable, since 
“Europe has no essence per se, but is a discursive construct and a product of many 
overlapping discourses”.160 The role of Europe for national identification is there also part 
of a discursive struggle.
161
 At the same time, an idea of Europe/ the EU is inseparable 
from Serbian national discourse. 
Politically, during the last decade, Serbia has been seen moving away from 
radical nationalism towards becoming a democratic state. Moreover, Serbia has found 
itself cooperating with the regional partners as it has improved political and economic 
relations with the neighbouring countries: 
 
“Regional relations had reached a new level of trust and understanding…we have found 
ways to work together…”162  
 
The political speeches of the EU representatives also suggest we should be optimistic 
about the current developments in the Balkans and see the region as relatively stable.
163
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The EU discourse on Serbia stresses EU’s support for Serbia’s integration if it fulfils the 
set of conditions and offers rhetorical reassurance about EU’s intentions to see Serbia as 
part of Europe: 
 
“I can assure you that the EU wants Serbia to succeed”  
(statement by C. Ashton on Serbia’s membership)164 
 
However, although the main pillar of Serbian foreign policy is its relationship 
with the EU and possible membership,
165
 one particular issue offers a different discourse 
on positive Serbian development. An area where European and Serbian political 
discourses differ and which has a negative connotation for the discursive construction of 
Serbian identity in the European discourse is the issue of Kosovo and Serbian opposition 
to recognize its independence. 
 Within the European political discourse, it is widely acknowledged that 
Kosovo’s future is Serbia’s future. The main construction is that Serbian EU hopes are 
tied to Kosovo – if Serbia wants to join the EU, it must first normalize ties with 
Kosovo.
166
 The territorial disputes with Kosovo, ongoing for several years, reveal a clash 
between a European dimension of Serbian politics with its membership aspirations and 
old-Serbia narratives when it comes to contested notion of Serbian identity. The tension 
over constructions of Serbian identity and European identity, which are attempting to be 
mutually compatible, returned an ‘old’ understanding of the signifier Serbian identity 
with its ethno-national markers. The topic is clearly linked with national priorities. 
Kosovo is closely tied to Serbian understanding of identity, as illustrated in the following 
speech: 
 
“I am expecting, I am asking everyone... to expect legitimate Serbian interest… we are member 
state of the UN, we have our legitimate rights… we have identity… and the origin of our identity 
is in Kosovo”.167 
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Serbian political leaders, being proponents of the pro-European developments, found it 
difficult to accommodate these developments within the structure of discourse of the 
European Union. The European Union sees a clash between attempts of Serbian leaders 
to present Serbia as European, yet at the same time against Kosovo’s territorial integrity. 
Presenting Kosovo as an enemy to Serbian nation or a threat to Serbian sovereignty is 
seen as an unwelcomed attitude by the European Union. Indirectly, it questions Serbian 
Europeanness. The signifier of Europeanness appears to have different meanings for 
Serbia and the European Union. During the war, the political discourse on Kosovo was 
meant to accentuate the difference between Serbian and Albanian. Nowadays, it is used to 
accentuate a just and unjust Europe. For Serbia, EU integration stands in opposition to 
preservation of the state territory which has political consequences. On a more abstract 
level, Serbia is struggling with the European demands which are in contrast with its own 
vision of identity. For the EU, ethno-national markers prominent in the discourse of 
Serbian politicians after Kosovo’s independence are unacceptable with the vision of 
Europeanness. Such discourse is not expected of a country wishing to join the EU. 
However, when it comes to political action, while Serbian politicians postulated a 
direct opposition to recognize Kosovo’s independence, they had also made clear the 
history will not repeat itself and the violent conflicts which took place during Milosevic’s 
political activity are not likely: 
  
“… those who will try to do something like that (ask Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence) 
will fail” ... but at the same time I don’t think Serbia can bring new conflict to the European 
Union.” 168 
 
Indeed, Kosovo’s secession, which in the Serbian discourse figured as a clear political 
loss of Serbia, did not bring country back into the cycle of violence, although small 
violent incidents happened.
169
 The potential benefits of EU membership seemed to be 
more valuable than the loss of Kosovo. Leaders openly confirmed their intention not to be 
involved in a similar conflict. What was also stressed was a willingness to improve 
relations with the neighbouring countries and Serbia´s ambition to become a fully 
democratic state. Such statements highlight a difference between current Serbia´s 
understanding of the EU and the one of Milosevic. 
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 Selected political issue of Kosovo´s independence has to be placed within a 
broader debate about the accession process and demands made by the EU. Kosovo´s 
independence was an important momentum for the Serbian population and it was the 
identity rhetoric that was used to explain why Serbia cannot accept its independence per 
se. The issue of Kosovo was presented as an issue of statehood. As discussed in the 
previous parts, Kosovo’s national/historical role in Serbian history is profound. Those 
who are for Kosovo´s independence would be against the Serbian state.
170
 The particular 
nature of discourse reveals that territorial integrity is not the only reason for Serbian 
opposition to Kosovo´s independence; it is about the very core of Serbian identity itself. 
The EU´s demand on Serbia to accept an independent Kosovo is seen as a threat to 
Serbia´s independence and sovereignty.  
Nowadays, by borrowing an analogy from Ole Waever’s argument on Europe’s 
other, I would argue that it is Serbia’s own radical past which stands for Serbia’s other, 
and which does not allow it to become its “present self”.  The foreign policy issue of 
Kosovo’s independence reveals one example of a clash between EU membership as 
foreign policy priority and Serbian understanding of the self. This tension between the 
Serbian and European political discourse on Kosovo and in an abstract sense 
Europeanness makes Serbian identity to appear incompatible with European identity.  
What is observable is that the European political discourse shows patterns of 
moving away from a negative portrait of Serbian identity to a positive one when Serbia 
finds itself agreeing to comply with European “standards”. If it does not comply, political 
action is taken, such as when the lack of progress in issuing war criminals cost the 
country postponing of accession talk. One could argue that the use of sanctions against 
communities displaying non-European features can point towards on-going attempts to 
construct European identity and to build a policy as to define what “the other” non- 
European constitutes. In the next part, I want to pay attention to theorization on the 
European Union and the problematic of standard setting, since I believe a new identity 
begins to crystallise around the notions of Europeaness and EU plays an essential role in 
the construction of Serbian identity.  
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5.4 Europeanization – where next? 
The notion of Europeanness plays a common currency in the identity politics on the 
European periphery. Attempts at regional reintegration can be interpreted as 
Europeanization consisting of debalkanization, where the later means establishing peace 
in the region. Indeed, it seems the discussion about EU’s normative pillar proliferated 
with the ongoing enlargement process.  
Scholars have become intrigued in addressing the impact of European integration 
on domestic policies and offer a wide range of explanations how EU transforms domestic 
political structures. First, Europeanization has a two dimensional character of “uploading 
and downloading” which means establishing clear causal factors is extremely difficult as 
“the challenge is to model the impact of European integration on domestic policy, 
knowing that at the same time domestic politics is a major factor at work in EU political 
change”171. Second, both political actors, the EU and aspiring member states, are evolving 
units, with changing policies and legislation.
172
  
According to a rationalist model, the price of compliance with EU conditions 
plays a central role in willingness of candidate countries to adopt EU rules. States comply 
with EU rules when the cost calculations favour benefits of EU membership over the 
domestic price of compliance.
173
 The EU uses the system of “reinforcement by reward” 
which means it rewards those states which comply with the pre-set conditions and 
withholds rewards if state fails to comply with them. The rationalists tend to look at the 
material costs and benefits: how exciting it is to join the EU, what is the level of public 
support, what public polls say, etc.  The constraints on the impact of the EU are therefore 
about the domestic adjustment costs- if it costs too much to advocate the reform the EU is 
promoting, to get it through the parliament, there is a less likelihood of successful 
Europeanization. The focus is on what the EU is “asking” candidate states to do and 
whether it is worth doing it. To sum up, the EU’s influence is all about the incentives it 
offers, the agenda it sets and how exciting it is for the countries to join the Union. 
 Another area of Europeanization studies stresses the dimension of social 
learning, according to which states are willing to adopt pre-set European rules and meet 
the conditions only if they perceive them in accordance with their value/normative 
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system.
174
 European rules have to be perceived as legitimate.
175
 Membership in the 
European Union depends on the level of adherence to deeper constitutive norms. These 
are referred to as specific normative elements, such as democratic governance, protection 
of minority rights, and peaceful foreign relations.
176
 Similarly, Bulmer and Radaelli 
highlight an informal element of EU’s transformative power as one of the features of 
Europeanization.  According to their definition, “Europeanisation is not simply about 
formal policy rules but about less tangible aspects, such as beliefs and values.”177  
A great number of Europeanization scholars questions how the EU socializes 
aspiring member states by altering their identities, preferences and interests.
178
 One 
reason for unsuccessful socialisation of potential member states is stated as tension 
between national interests and European values.
179
 Such conceptualisation requires an 
understanding of the European Union as a system of values, although it can be a system 
full of contradiction.  
In terms of Union’s transformative power, its positive impact in the 
Central/Eastern Europe is often highlighted. It is often argued that no other international 
organisation had such a deep and extensive influence on the domestic policies of other 
countries.
180
 Accession of these states into European structures had an effect on different 
layers of the state, ranging from judicial system, the rule of law, various regulatory 
policies, and environmental issues to identities. The constructivists in IR have a lot to say 
about how the EU worked in Central-Eastern Europe in terms of construction of an 
alternative identity after the fall of communism.
181
 Arguably, after 1989, there was a very 
strong emotional attachment to the idea of Europe, and particularly the identity politics of 
Europe played a very positive role in underpinning the whole process of reforms.
182
 
Enlargement was not about cost-benefit calculations,
 
it was about a shared identity, 
something people felt was about their own identity as Europeans. The process of identity 
construction is in this understanding related to the end of the Cold War, ending of an 
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artificial division of Europe and finding a European identity.
 183
 They argue that the 
questions of identity and legitimacy are intertwined and the EU’s influence also works 
through identity construction within the EU and with the potential members.  
I have been informed by above illustrated strands which all address the issue of 
Europeanization and take into account their understanding of the subject. All of the 
approaches have helped me to better understand Serbian transformation processes and 
with the analysis of the political developments. Nevertheless, my perspective on identity 
focuses mainly on understanding identities as relational and discursive constructs. For the 
reading of Serbian identity, it means Serbian identity is also discursively constructed and 
what is to be considered is how Serbia defines the Serbian Self with contrast to Others. 
Aligned with this theoretical assumption, poststructuralist approach to identity study 
would assume that Serbian discourse on the EU and/or Kosovo, through its representation 
of these units, is telling in terms of discursive constructions of Serbian identity. 
Therefore, it is important to consider how Serbia talks about the EU/Kosovo and identity. 
The Europeanization sets specific normative targets for Serbia and the EU as its 
representative serves as an instrument of change pushing Serbia forward away from its 
troubled past. Serbia is a unique case because it did not fully identify with the European 
identity despite formulating the EU membership as an official foreign policy priority. To 
understand why it is so, we need to take into account Serbia’s perception of West/Europe 
and impact of Serbian post-Yugoslav identity formation. The legacy of the past is still 
present in the current discourse about Serbia’s Europeanness.  
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6 How European? 
Europeanization can mean something very specific, as well as elusive. It can describe 
means as well as an end process. Europeanization is fluid to a certain degree since 
different regions and countries give it different meaning. In terms of relationship between 
Serbian national identity and level of Europeanization, it appears to be more an issue of 
countries willingness to adhere to changes than its capacity to do so. This is because 
national interest often crash with the EU pressures on reforms.
184
 Disagreement over 
sensitive issues, like the treatment of minorities, territorial integrity and extradition of war 
criminals, have slowed down the process of reforms.
185
 Despite a slow progress, EU 
rhetoric points to an integration of the country into Europe’s fold: 
 
“People in Serbia have a European perspective and Serbia’s place is within the European 
family.”186 
 
 Serbia is currently in the preparatory pre-accession phase which means we are dealing 
with a process where EU externally defines what change means; it has no influence over 
the agenda of Europeanization as members of the EU do. The EU therefore can have 
significant influence on the domestic discourse of the countries.  
EU as a normative power defines which norms Serbia has to accept: accept past 
crimes, reconsolidate with neighbours, etc. Another area is an adoption of acquis 
communitaire. As the Union widens and deepens, the volume of the acquis grows too.  
This means more rules, regulations and agreements than during the previous 
enlargements. As a country seeking membership of the European Union, Serbia was 
formally required to conform to the conditions set out by the accession criteria (also 
known as The Copenhagen Criteria of Accession), established by the Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993. The criteria can be divided into three sub-groups: political, 
economic and a specific acceptance of the acquis communitaire. According to The 
Copenhagen Criteria
187
, any country that wishes to join the European Union is required to 
meet the following accession criteria:  
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 political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
 economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 
 acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union. 
 
An additional requirement was demanded of Serbia: full cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The rationale behind 
this demand was to provide “access to documents and witnesses, in support of on-going 
or planned ICTY trials” and identification of individuals responsible for war crimes in the 
Yugoslav conflict.
188
 This requirement is sometimes referred to as “conditionality 
plus”.189 Initially, the level of cooperation was low and Serbia faced growing 
dissatisfaction from the international community over its attitude towards the court. 
According to the political elites, the legacy of the past was not to be perceived as a 
defining moment for the future direction of the state. Serbian political leaders presented 
the conflict as a shared responsibility of all the waging states, and expected equal 
treatment when it came to reconciliation and responsibility for the war crimes. The 
tension between the European and Serbian visions of responsibility is seen in the 
following quote of president Nikolic, where it is apparent that Serbian leader accuses the 
West of presenting the Serbs as the only perpetrators and those responsible for the 
conflict: 
 
“Someone is trying to establish the conclusion that the Serbian side alone was conducting 
killings and genocide in a bestial and orgiastic manner, while the other side sat on its 
hands, dealing with its daily routines and humanitarian work.”190 
 
However, things have improved over time and on 29 April 2008, the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement was signed between the European Union and Serbia.
191
 The 
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SAA granted Serbia the status of associated state to the EU and made it accountable for 
progress in complying with the stated set of conditions. Serbia showed clear interest in 
becoming “the acceding EU country with the clear perspective of EU membership”.192  
Europeanization is therefore an elusive term and can generate domestic clashes 
over the nature of reforms, as well as identity. The argumentation of what constitutes the 
“ideal” national interest and national identity is especially heated in the Western Balkans. 
The countries seem to want a European future, but they are not sure how European it 
should be. In case of Serbia, domestic resistance was mainly hindered by the nationalist 
forces. The problem is that part of the political elites seemed to be suspicious of the 
international community which, according to their view, has been rather anti-Serbian 
when it comes to its actions. The legitimacy of the changes required by the EU is thus 
difficult to defend in front of the domestic audience. Nevertheless, European integration 
remains the most salient issue in Serbian foreign policy: 
 
“The EU is the warranty for our stability, the referee for our quarrels and the groundwork 
for a long term and maintainable prosperity.”193 
 
6.1 The Balkan question is a European question 
When it comes to the Balkans, the EU incentives cannot seem to overcome the identity 
issues - to resolve the issues of unfinished reconciliation. The Balkan states, Serbia 
included, are dealing with huge political issues about the status of the country, its 
territory, monopoly, etc. Whether the Balkans should join the EU is sometimes 
discursively constructed as a pointless question. The argument is that the Western Balkan 
states are already enclaved in Europe, geographically and politically surrounded by 
Europe, and there is simply “no alternative” than an eventual accession.194  
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"Despite difficulties in the crisis, the European unification has yet to be completed - it continues. 
Serbia deserves the fully-fledged membership in the EU as it is an essential part of the European 
unification. Serbia is already a part of Europe in historic, political and human terms”.195 
 
However, Europeanization is extremely demanding
196
 and the countries in South East 
Europe are up against a moving target that runs faster and becomes more demanding by 
the day”.197 Nevertheless, starting from an assumption that an ultimate goal of the 
Western Balkan countries is the EU membership, and that the EU represents the most 
influential international organization, it is very likely that the criteria set up by the EU 
will remain influential on Serbia’s transition processes.  Nevertheless, the changing 
nature of political landscape and closer ties with the EU required a new attitude towards 
understanding of what it means to be European. Cooperation with the Kosovo was a 
precondition to receive appraisal from the EU Institutions and start moving into the right 
direction. In the next part, I will focus on the relationship between the EU and Serbia on 
the issue of Kosovo to highlight this problematic. I specifically focus on national 
discourse on Kosovo/on European integration. When the Serbian political elites speak 
about Serbia in relation to Kosovo and the EU, they are also reflecting and creating 
Serbia’s identity.198 Analysing political discourse provides a lesson about how politicians 
see Serbia and what reality they construct through their discourse. 
 
6.2 Foreign policy and Identity 
Foreign policy is closely tied with representation of identity – one shapes another in a 
mutual manner. Analysing foreign policy by applying poststructuralist approach means 
understanding foreign policy as a discursive practise.
199
 Policy discourses are results of 
social processes where addressing opposition and the general public takes place in order 
to institutionalize policymakers’ “understanding of the identities and policy options at 
stake”.200Mobilisation of identity for the purpose of presentation and implementation of 
foreign policy is dependent on the discursive practices. Identity is thus inseparable from 
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foreign policy.
201
 In this sense, policies are a direct result of representation of the factor 
they address. Understanding of the factor requires enunciation of identities of “Other” as 
well as “Self”. Identity is hereby understood as “discursive and political, relational and 
social”.202 Identities are not only relationist but also contextual which means they are 
defined in relation to other identities in a particular time-framed setting.  They appear to 
be stable within a certain discourse.  
As established in the theoretical part, language brings things into being and it can 
be understood as “social and political, and inherently unstable system of signs that 
generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference”.203 
Derrida refers to it a system of juxtapositions –set of valued and devalued signs. Due to 
an ambiguous nature of language as structured and unstable at the same time, one must be 
aware of possible “undecidability” of texts. This is where Foucault brings attention to 
political agency and its effects on creation and recreation of discourses (Foucault 1997). 
Articulation of policies as reactions to problems happen via construction of policy 
problems which happen via policy discourses (Foucault 1977).  
Foreign policy issues require an interpretative approach. Identities are not stable 
and therefore any conceptualization of identity depends on continuous articulation by 
opposing discourses. Identities are also relational in a sense they are expressed in contrast 
to each other and constituted via collective.
204
 In order to legitimize a particular foreign 
policy, political actors rely on a representation of identity. Identities are therefore 
constitutive of foreign policy.
205
 It should be also acknowledged that fluidity of national 
identity is limited by specific time and space and certain aspects of national identity are 
politicized over others.   
 
6.3 Kosovo 
Why has Serbia been reluctant to accept specific European political requirements to 
accept Kosovo’s independence which would help Serbia towards EU accession, which is 
after all Serbia’s primary foreign policy goal? I argue that what can be observed in the 
EU-Serbia discourse on Kosovo is identity divergence, where political actors define 
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themselves in contrast to presumably shared values and norms. I will be looking at 
discursive practices used by Serbian political elites to interpret foreign policy issues of 
national importance.
206
 
Borders are key modality when it comes to the fraught relationship between 
Serbia and Kosovo. When Kosovo declared independence, events and injustices of the 
past were once again brought into the narratives of the present. The way that some 
politicians publicly opposed the demands by EU for a separate entity in Kosovo signify 
differences over a definition of national identity. Serbia´s reaction to independence was 
seen as mirroring a notion of victimhood which again stressed the place of Kosovo in 
Serbian and Kosovar nation building. Indeed, similar rhetoric to that of Milosevic’s 
nationalist discourse which put Serbs in a position of victims of Western powers who 
wanted to suppress it emerged.
207
 
The issue of Kosovo’s independence was instrumentalised by political forces 
across the region and the waiting years to dissolve the problem have been deeply 
traumatizing and destructive both for Kosovo and Serbia. The International Community 
was accused of keeping the status quo, deliberate ambiguity of the state. Their presence in 
Kosovo was strongly criticised: 
 
“… the results achieved by the International Community that took over responsibility for solving 
this problem as of June 10, 1999, are also disastrous. Despite the presence of the international 
armed forces, police forces and administration, more than 200,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians 
were expelled from Kosovo and Metohia, and more than 1,300 Serbs were killed, about 1200 
people being reported as missing.”208 
 
Kosovo is also postulated as constitutive of Serbian identity: 
 
For Serbia, the Kosovo problem [...] is not just a question of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, but, above all, a question of preserving the identity. 
[...] Today, we are facing the attempts to usurp the Serbian orthodox identity in Kosovo 
and Metohija [...] No one without the identity has a future. That question is transcendent 
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and it is the core of our existence. […] Serbia is the Christian cradle of Europe.209 
 
When Kosovo declared independence, one could trace a division within Kosovo Serb 
community itself between those who were moderate and ready to accept new status of 
Kosovo, and those who decided to go as radical as they could.
210
 The repetition of the 
ethnic segregation was visible once again. All the institutions that were built up with the 
help of the presence of the international community were ethnically segregated, 
especially the Kosovo police service, where an establishment of separate Albanian 
Kosovo police and Serbian Kosovo police forces was kept. The Northern Kosovo was 
also described as a blank area where neither Kosovo nor Serbia can benefit from - neither 
Kosovo nor Serbia can claim taxes, gain control over illegal businesses, etc. since 
regional cooperation was basically non-existent.
211
  
The independence of Kosovo should have been mainly seen as a possibility of 
conceiving the recognition of Kosovo as a transformative event. Kosovo´s independence 
was a chance to come to terms with what had happened and to move forward. However, 
Serbia found a position where it could no longer articulate the representation of place 
extremely difficult. What seemed to underline Serbia’s anti-independence rhetoric 
towards Kosovo is that protecting Serbian national identity was closely tied to protecting 
“Serbian” territory and those two appeared to be inseparable:212  
 
“Well, for us, Serbs, Kosovo is like the very air we breathe. It‘s the beating heart of our 
culture - and home to our most sacred shrines. Kosovo is the land where hundreds of thousands of 
Serbs gave their lives for their country and the cause of freedom. [...] [Kosovo] is in our dreams at 
night, and in our prayers in the church. It is the apple of our eye. It is our Jerusalem.”213 
 
Support of European states for Kosovo’s independence created a strong sense of injustice 
and antagonism towards the EU. Serbian ambivalent attitudes towards the EU were 
discursively shaped around the notion that being European comes at great cost. The EU 
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was seen as an actor taking something away, whether described as territory or in more 
abstract terms national pride, part of history. 
Nevertheless, some of the most important things that are happening are not 
reported in the international press and that is there are direct communications without 
foreigners intervening for daily issues between Belgrade and Pristina. There has been a 
shift in Serbian politics on the issue of Kosovo: 
 
“we (Serbs) do not seek confrontation but compromise… Serbian response to Pristina’s 
independence is wholly unknown to the Balkan experience…”214 
 
 Although Serbia remains reluctant to accept the independence for Kosovo, the response 
found in the discourse of Kosovo seems like a rhetorical resistance with eventual 
acceptance: 
 
“(we are) leaving bad things in the past and trying looking into the future… using a little 
bit of patience and understanding for the position of the other side… that’s how we see this 
process.. that is the goal we are trying to achieve when it comes to Kosovo”215 
 
One of the arguments that are highlighted by the EU is that if Serbia moves 
towards Europe, there will be a kind of momentum that will help the other states of the 
region too. Serbia not only wishes to join the EU, it also aims to help fostering integration 
of all the Balkans: 
 
“…and at the end of the day (our Serbian hope is) to bring all people that are living on the Balkans 
within the European union”216 
 
The EU also stresses a need for a progress in the regional integration and opening of the 
channels of communication between the states is important and welcomed.
217
 Arguably, 
through its accession process, the EU has exerted a significant on-going influence on the 
pace and character of post conflict state building in both Serbia and Kosovo, and the EU 
membership works here as a conflict prevention strategy: 
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“In our estimation, the best way to proceed is to build a common future in Europe in which 
borders and minority problems will lose its importance.”218 
 
Now, in the post-Milosevic era, the political discourse seems to underline a need for a 
transformation of Serbian identity from victims to democrats. However, due to the nature 
of conflict and atrocities resulted from it, the international community at the same time 
poses limitations on what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate forms of national 
manifestation when it comes to Serbia. And this is highly problematic. For Serbia, it 
opens a question if democratic government can and should be held responsible for the 
acts of the non-democratic predecessors.
219
 It also means coming in terms with its own 
contested vision of national identity, being positioned between past and present. 
 
“Each nation state in the western Balkans is proud of its identity. It is something to be cultivated 
and not washed away. Identity is not an impediment to fulfilling the regions potential.”220 
 
As discussed, political identities in the post-Milosevic transition in Serbia are being 
constantly rethought and negotiated. The image of Serbian identity within the political 
discourse of “new” Serbia remains contested. There is still no political consensus on 
Serbia’s agency in post-Yugoslav conflicts221 and the relationship with European Union 
remains often unclear too. Moreover, the process of EU integration is burdened by the 
unresolved national issues. It is often stressed that the stability of the whole region 
depends on Serbia’s stability and stability/security of the region is important for stability 
of the Union. Indirectly, the EU requires a re-definition of Serbian identity which needed 
for successful integration into the EU. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
 
Identities are not consensual or smooth. While I acknowledge the adaptation of domestic 
formal institutions to EU pressures, I decided to focus on the process of identity 
transformation of the Serbian state. What is especially poignant is that while the EU 
requires adhesion to European rules and laws (conditionality), it officially does not 
require adoption of collective European identity per se. However, the changes in domestic 
structures that are results of EU’s formal pressure to adhere to European standards 
arguably influence the way nations view and presents themselves. Therefore, I tried to 
illustrate how Europeanization impacts collective understanding of Serbian nation-state. 
It seems that the effect of European identity depends on its coherence with the state’s own 
idea about its nation and compatibility of visions of political order. It is interesting to look 
at how Europe and Europeanness is understood and incorporated in the Serbian discourse. 
European integration is rhetorically used as a tool/insurance against the revival of 
nationalist tendencies.
222
 Western discourse presents the Union as an actor of peace. 
Serbian conflict-ridden past is being understood as the Balkans’ past, and deeply 
rooted markers of Serbian nation-state identity are sometimes in opposition to vision of 
Europe the EU promotes. Despite existing clashes over problematic issue of Kosovo, 
Serbia stresses its EU aspirations and willingness to become a part of the European 
Union. It appears that it is Serbia’s past that stands for its other, rather than Europe.223 
Serbia is in the process of reconstruction of national identity - trying to distance from the 
past and emphasis the European future.  
Nonetheless, post-conflict identity formation is a complex process with open-
endings. It is not guaranteed that despite the current pro-European rhetoric foreign policy 
choices will not change and membership will no longer be a priority. The presented 
insights should be taken as fragments of the current post-conflict transformation process, 
and these fragments are open to different interpretations 
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7.1 Summary 
 
In order to analyse the reconstruction of Serbian identity, this thesis utilized a 
poststructuralist theoretical framework and a discourse analytical method. The focus of 
the study was to offer an alternative theorising on identities and the process of othering 
and politics; on the way identities are constructed and reconstructed through the processes 
of interactions and implications of identity changes for the political and vice-versa. 
The findings on Serbian political developments have identified the civilizational 
discourse that creates a division between the European Union and Serbia as part of the 
Balkans, and attempts to discursively construct what European/Europeanness stands for. 
The Union aspires to clearly define who can belong to and who can be excluded from the 
membership, setting conditions for those wishing to become an EU members, like Serbia. 
The Balkans plays a central role in the discourse on Serbian identity. It is constructed as 
both geographical and civilizational space, but its borders are not fixed. Depending on an 
intention of political leaders, the meaning of the Balkans shifts from negativist 
associations, such as violent, backward, un-civilized to positive connotations of 
transforming, democratic, progressive, etc. While geopolitical belonging is stable, 
civilizational belonging is intertwined with political decisions. At the same time, attempts 
to de-Balkanise Serbia are going on – whether through EU’s involvement in posing as a 
mediator between Kosovo and Serbia, or Serbia’s initiatives aimed at better regional 
cooperation and improved relations with its neighbourhood countries. 
Serbian political discourse is defined by attempts to change the meaning of the 
self and coming in terms with the radical other which is Serbia’s own past. Because of the 
nature of political relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the discourse of the backward 
Balkan is still being reproduced. By perpetuating certain discourses about Kosovo, Serbia 
identifies itself against the other which helps us to better understand discursive 
construction of its identity. The construction of the Serbian other has an impact on the 
construction of the Serbian self. In political terms, it means that cooperation with Kosovo 
is established as something on which Serbia’s belonging to Europe or the Balkans 
depends on. Arguably, a new construction of Serbian identity is becoming to crystallise, 
as improvement in mutual relationship between Kosovars and Serbs is being achieved.      
 The thesis also theorises how changing political circumstances enable new 
discursive constructions of Serbian identity and how the nodal point ‘EU’ provides 
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transforms the meaning of signifiers such as democracy, rights and justice. The European 
Union, with its construction of ‘Europeanness’, plays a crucial role in the reconstruction 
of Serbian identity, as in Serbia’s political progress.  Moreover, the Europeanization 
implies a political shift enabling change in the previous constructions of antagonisms by 
focusing on the present and future. Discourses of nationalist interpretations of identity are 
being replaced by formulations of wish to become a member of the European Union and 
thus part of the European space. As a result, constructions of identity perpetuated by 
militant nationalism of the Milosevic era are becoming gradually marginalized.  
 To conclude, these assumptions do not wish to be interpreted as an objective 
description of the transition process in Serbia. They should be instead read as limited 
interpretations of the outlined process, avoiding totalisation and closure. I aimed to mark 
out attempts to fix the meaning of the political, understood as processes with open-
endings. 
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